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"On ‘Money’ in ISLM and AD/AS Models"1
Introduction
Hicks’s ISLM model interpretation of Keynes’s theory  is subject to much controversy.   In this paper,2 3
we focus upon the ‘real balance’ effect and its role in ISLM and AD/AS analyses.   We shall argue that4
ISLM and AD/AS require ‘nominal anchors’. We live in a world where, increasingly, the ‘money’ in
the ISLM and AD/AS model no longer exists (as Keynes imperfectly understood in his TREATISE
ON MONEY). There are no longer any nominal anchors, rather they have been replaced by
discretionary policy. As Professor Ferris nicely sums up our position, we argue that central banks are
fundamentals.
A Review
In any standard ISLM analysis, the IS schedule is 
(1)
where y is output in ‘real’ terms or constant prices, i is (a complex of) the ‘real’ rate(s) of interest,  is
the given ‘real’ stock of capital,  is a given nominal stock of money, such as circulating currency
issued by the central bank and the nominal stock of (say, demand) deposits held by the nonbank public
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One does this by means of the standard well known formula5
implying that H is considered as part of the wealth of the private sector. Though it is a liability of the
government sector, it is assumed in standard analysis that changes in its real value do not affect the
expenditure of the public sector. Our paper argues that this formula no longer has any content in
modern monetary economies.
 By means of writing y as a function of L(and K) and the price level being equal to the money6
wage rate divided by the marginal physical product of labour, the whole analysis can be cast in  terms
of interest rates and levels of employment, with the levels of employment being inversely related to the
level of money wage rates. Such a presentation indicates clearly how different such analyses are from
that of Keynes.
as liabilities of the banks.  While the expected rate of change of prices is taken to be zero in our
discussion, it can be easily adapted to expectations of inflation or deflation. One can rewrite (1.1) as 
(2)
where  is a given nominal stock of fiat, base or outside money made up of circulating currency and
the nominal stock of reserves held by the banks, both liabilities of the central bank.5
It is assumed that  
The LM schedule is (3)
where  
The two schedules determine i and y for any given P.  A lower P will be associated with a higher y and
a higher/lower i (see appendix).   The negative relationship between P and y gives the AD curve, shown6
(in the appendix) convex in (P, y). 
The relationship between ISLM and AD/AS, when the (money wage rate and) price level is lower at
P* than at P, is illustrated in Figure 1.
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 For different conclusions, see J. Tobin, "Price flexibility and output stability: an old Keynesian7
view", Journal of Economic Perspectives, VII, 1993, 45-65  and M. Friedman, PRICE THEORY
(1976), 319-321. Tobin argues that falling prices will create instability because of exacerbated
Fisherian debt-deflation effects, excess demand for money because nominal interest rates cannot go
negative and consequently even greater falls in prices, in short, price and output instability. Friedman
distinguishes between output and real private income, out of which expenditure on output takes place.
It is well known that one is dealing with lower price levels not with falling price levels, the latter perhaps
being associated with lower aggregate demand.7
4Private real income is output plus (minus) real capital gains (losses) from holding outside fiat money,
with debt-delation effects offsettingly distributional. The faster prices fall the greater is real private
income and the greater are expenditures on output. In the extreme case of no capital formation, real
private income, by Friedman’s dynamic version of the real balance effect, would be greater the greater
the fall in prices and real consumption expenditure would approach the full employment level of output.
At that point prices and money wages would stop falling and Tobin’s spectre of instability set aside.
 B. McCallum, “The development of Keynesian macroeconomics”, American Economic8
Review, May 1987, 125 quoted in Boris D. Pesek, MICROECONOMICS OF MONEY AND
BANKING AND OTHER ESSAYS (Hemel Hampstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988).
 Keynes thought the Pigou-Kalecki effect was "...too fantastic for words". See Robert9
Dimand, "Keynes, Kalecki, Ricardian equivalence, and the real balance effect", Bulletin of Economic
Research, XLIII, July 1991, 289-292.
  Friedman, op. cit. and Bennett T. McCallum, MONETARY ECONOMICS: Theory10
and Policy (1989). McCallum’s views about the empirical unimportance of the real balance effect are
drawn up in the context of evaluating the welfare costs of steady inflation. The basic conclusion in his
summary analytical framework, which must follow from the assumed presence of nominal anchors and
the belief that policy is concerned with the manipulation of such costless fiat creatures, is that most
macroeconomists accept as a theoretical principle that deviations of output or employment "...cannot
be affected permanently by monetary policy."(216).
Ignoring negative interest rates, the so-called Patinkin ‘real balance’ effect (and the so-called Keynes
effect, which is really just part of the Patinkin effect) means there is necessarily a level of prices (and
money wage rates) such that y is at full employment, contrary to Keynes’s basic position that such a
level may, not must, exist. One quotation is enough to represent a widely held view.
"But in [t]his admirable attempt at formal theory, Keynes failed.  His top-priority goal of
articulating a model with an unemployment equilibrium...... foundered on the Pigou-
Patinkin real balance effect"8
Initial Criticism
Keynes knew of the Pigou effect and dismissed it as empirically unimportant.  So do Friedman and9
McCallum.   Here is a curious argument. While it is stated that one would not rely upon ‘real balance’10
effects in the real world, they nevertheless prove that Keynes’s contention that there may exist a less
than full employment equilibrium is without theoretical foundation. As Friedman (321) says, 
5 They are examples of what Coates calls scholasticism. See John Coates, THE CLAIMS11
OF COMMON SENSE: Moore, Wittgenstein, Keynes and the social sciences (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996)
 See Marc Lavoie, FOUNDATIONS OF POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMIC12
ANALYSIS (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), See especially Chap 4 Credit and Money, Basil J.
Moore, HORIZONTALISTS AND VERTICALISTS: The macroeconomics of credit money
and Charles Goodhart, "Money supply control: Base or interest rates?", eds. K. Hoover and S.
Sheffrin, MONETARISM AND THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS (Aldershot:
Edward Elgar, 1995) reprinted in Goodhart, THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (Cambridge, MIT press, 1995).
"The Pigovian and [Friedman’s] the more far-reaching answer to Keynes’s proposition
have been extremely important on a theoretical level in assuring that there is no basic
flaw in our theoretical analysis. But I hasten to add that in my opinion neither
corresponds to effects that are empirically important in the kind of economic
fluctuations that actual economies experience." (our italics)
One of our objectives in writing this paper is to eliminate the mental tensions such extraordinary
statements must create.  11
One can also say that, since H includes circulating currency, which modern central banks do not control
but rather allow to expand or contract to meet changes in the nominal (and real) demand for circulating
currency, the partial endogenization of money undercuts the empirical and theoretical rational for the
role of ‘real balances’ in the IS-LM model and the implication that differences in the price level can
have equilibrating properties in the AD/AS models.  While it is undoubtedly true that no modern
monetary authority operates on the stock of circulating central bank notes or fiat coin to control price
levels, they still have, according to the traditional position, the stock of reserves in the form of deposits
held by private banks with the central banks on which to operate. While it can be argued that private
agents, in a world of lower price levels, will use their holdings of circulating currency to pay off
overdrafts and loans so that deposits and currency, M, in the hands of the public and price levels P, will
be positively correlated, there need exist no such positive correlation between reserves of banks with
the central bank and price levels. That is, while it might be argued that M = M (P) such that M  > O soP
that lower prices are associated with lower ‘money’ supplies, one cannot argue that H = H (P) and HP
> O with similar conviction.   12
Major Criticism
6 See J.M. Keynes, THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD13
KEYNES, VI, THE GENERAL THEORY, xxii-xxiii. See also Thomas K. Rymes, KEYNES’S
LECTURES, 1932-35: Notes of a Representative Student (London and Ann Arbor:  Macmillan
for the Royal Economic Society and University of Michigan Press, 1989), 8. 
The major point of this paper is that the stock of nominal fiat high powered money has vanished in
modern monetary economies.  There is no nominal anchor! There is no H which will be a co-
determinant of P nor is there an H which will ensure, via the ‘real balance’ effect, a full employment
price level. Keynes’s conjecture that there may exist less than full employment monetary equilibria
remains correct.
It is now increasingly established that central banks exercise control over nominal and real magnitudes,
in regimes where banks desire to hold zero reserves, not by altering the stock of reserves nor by fixing
interest rates but rather by operating upon the spreads or the relative price of banking services.  Central
banks always affect the price of banking services which are essentially the supply of liquid, and
accessible-at-least-cost, intertemporal transactions services.  Central banks are always operating upon
this real relative price so that the set of all relative prices cannot be ascertained independently of the
activity of the monetary authorities.  Just as Keynes argued  we now must work with a monetary13
theory of value.
Modern central banks, such as the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of Australia, have learned
that by ‘setting spreads’, i.e. by charging higher than market interest rates on banks’ negative settlement
balances and paying lower than market rates an banks’ positive settlement balances, they enforce
banks to pursue overdraft and deposit policies such that the banks expect to be in zero settlement
balances position in their clearings with the central Bank (hereafter just the Bank), unless the Bank is
taking non-neutral action.  Unless the Bank takes what we shall call enforcement actions, such as open
market operations or repos or redeposit and drawdown of government deposits (or overdrafts) with
the banks, the banking system, i.e. the set of all financial intermediaries offering transactions services,
will always be in balance, in an overall zero settlement balance position with the Bank.  Set aside
circulating currency for a moment.  In a world of paper transactions or increasingly electronic debits
and credits, one individual’s debit (an increase in her overdraft or decrease in her deposit) must be
matched by another individual’s credit (an increase in his deposit or decrease in his overdraft).  If the
individuals transact through different banks, her bank will be experiencing a negative settlement balance
with the Bank while his bank will be recording an equivalent positive settlement balance.  A market in
settlement balances will exist, such that through their private clearing arrangements, a House, her bank
will borrow his bank’s positive clearing balance at a rate lower than the Bank would charge while his
bank would loan its positive settlement balance at a rate higher than could earned with the Bank. 
Hence, unless the Bank puts the banking system as a whole into non-zero settlement balance positions,
the interbank market (or House) in settlement balances will clear at spreads or ‘service prices’ below
those of the Bank.
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 E. Baltensberger, Alternative approaches to the theory of the banking firm, Journal of14
Monetary Economics, VI, January 1980, 1-37.
 Bank of Canada, The Implementation of Monetary Policy in a System with Zero Reserve15
Requirements, Discussion Paper #3, revised September 1991.  This ‘2 for 1’ rule is now changed. 
See Bank of Canada, "A proposed framework for the implementation of monetary policy in the large
value transfer system environment," Discussion Paper #2, 1 March 1996 and Kevin Clinton,
"Implementation of monetary policy in a regime with zero reserve requirements", Bank of Canada
Working Paper 97-8, April 1997.
Private non bank agents transact with banks and face interest rates an overdrafts which exceed rates
paid by the banks on deposits, the spread said to be the ‘price’ of banking services.  Of course, the
‘spread’ the banks charge their customers is greater than that charged by the banks’ House and the
‘spread’ charged by the Bank.
From Baltensberger , the liquidity costs of a competitive bank are given as14
(4)
where i is the opportunity cost of reserves, R is precautionary reserves,  is the penalty rate charged
(say) by the Bank for being in reserve deficiency, X is the net loss experience, f(X) the density function
of such withdrawals assumed normal so that E(X) = 0.  The liquidity costs are minimized when
(5)
so that if R is zero, , or what emerges is the ‘2 for 1’ rule currently imposed by the Bank of
Canada.   That is, in order for a bank to conduct its overdraft and deposit policies such that it expects15
to be in a zero settlement balance position in the clearings, the penalty rate must be twice the
opportunity cost rate, for example, the rate banks could earn on demand overdrafts.
The structure of interest rates implied by the ‘2 for 1’ rule is that the Bank would pay a zero rate on
positive settlement balances, i  = o.  This implies that the cost of holding a positive settlement balancecr
with the Bank is i - i  / d  and that the penalty rate, designated i  (=2i), implies that the cost ofcr CB dr
holding a negative settlement balances with the bank is i  - i / d .  The expression d  is the carryingdr CB CB
cost, spread or service charge the Bank is levying for the provision of clearing and liquidity services.
ioO & iDD;
iBB & iLL;
8
 J. Chant, "The new theory of financial intermediation", eds. K. Dowd and M.K. Lewis,16
CURRENT ISSUES IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ECONOMICS (London:  Macmillan,
1992).
 A demand deposit has immediacy of access, a time deposit has an option which inhibits17
immediacy of access (or makes it more costly), with a time overdraft a bank cannot call so the
overdrafter is not subject to harassment while a demand overdraft is subject to call on demand.
When the Bank raises i  without altering i  it raises the charge it makes for the provision of services todr cr
the banks.  The service charge is composed of two parts:  the trivial debit and credit fees which ‘price’
the number of transactions; and the carrying cost, the ‘price’ for the provision of liquidity serves to
them.  Similarly, the House charges its members fees for its final clearing, as the banks swap settlement
balances and for the monitoring costs involved in the provision of the liquidity services the House
provides its member banks.
Individuals use the transactions services of banks since they (i) delegate the monitoring of persons to
whom they would lend and from whom they would borrow to the banks because it is less costly for the
banks, specializing in this activity, to do so; (ii) they use overdrafts and deposits for the execution of
transactions (and may use private bank notes as well) because, unlike other financial intermediaries,
banks promise to keep unchanged the nominal value of such overdrafts and deposits  and (iii) subject16
to known costs (the debit and credit fees and carrying costs) they debit and credit their deposits and
overdrafts because of immediacy of access on the part of depositors and non-immediacy of call
experienced by overdrafters.   Banks provide monitoring, a common service of financial17
intermediaries, but their assets and liabilities used in transactions are fixed in nominal terms with clear
terms of accessibility and established interest rates, debit-credit fees and carrying costs.
A bank is able to offer immediacy of access to demand depositors and non-callability to overdrafters
because it can tap the provisions of liquidity by the House.  A bank will not necessarily demand
payment of an overdue overdraft if it thinks the overdrafter’s credit is good but is merely in an illiquid
position if it can in turn borrow, at a cost in the House, in turn not subject to immediacy of call.  Thus,
the bank’s overdrafters and depositors are using indirectly the immediacy of accessibility at-least-cost
services supplied by the House.  Ultimately, of course, the banks and their House fall back on the
services of liquidity, provided at cost, by the Bank.
Banks, though increasingly less so, charge for their services through ‘spreads’.  A simple revenue
statement for a bank, with respect to overdrafts and deposits would be 
for a House
iDrDr & icrCr
9
 The UN (United Nations, SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 1993) argues there18
exists a ‘pure’ rate i, such that i  - i is the service charge paid by overdrafters and i - i  is that serviceo D
charge paid by depositors.
 In Canada, the Bank raises its borrowing and lending rates together, operating with ‘bands’.19
The increases in its  lending rate, the rate it charges for negative settlement balances, constrains banks
to reduce their overdrafts. The increase in the borrowing rate, the rate the Bank pays on positive
settlement balances, constrains banks to increase their deposits. Both represent an attempt by the banks
to move towards positive settlement balances but, try as they may, unless the Bank accommodates,
they cannot do so. Rates on overdrafts and deposits rise to the levels the Bank desires.
and for the Bank
where O and D are the banks* overdrafts and deposits, with their rates, i  and i ; B and L are theO D
borrowings from and lendings to the House by its members, with their rates i  and i ; and D  and C  areB L r r
the negative and positive settlement balances of banks with the central Bank, not swapped in the
House, with their respective rates i  and i .  We observe, in general, for demand overdrafts andDr Cr
deposits, 
i  > i  > i  > i  > i  > iDr B O D L Cr
One argues that i  - i  is the service charge levied on overdrafters and depositors by banks,  i  - i  is thatO D B L18
levied by Houses on their members while i  - i  is the service charge levied by Banks on banks unable toDr Cr
obtain accommodation through the House, that is, the price charged for the ultimate liquidity provided by
them.
Suppose the ‘spreads’ are such that the House and banks are producing a volume of nominal overdrafts
and deposits - that is, are producing a volume of services -  with which the Bank is content.  Suppose the
banks begin an expansion of overdrafts and deposits with which the Bank is not in accord.  The expansion
in banking output is too great.  Modern Banks raise their spreads, i.e. they raise i  keeping (say) iDr Cr
unchanged.  The Bank’s spread is higher, and the House and clearing banks know the price of the liquidity
services offered by the Bank is higher.  To the House and clearing banks, the cost of straying from zero
to negative settlement balances, compared with straying from zero to positive settlement balances, has
risen.   Competitive banks (and their House) will therefore try to unbalance their portfolios away from19
overdrafts towards deposits which of course, they cannot do.  Their spreads, their service charges, will rise.
Non banks will find therefore intertemporal surplus compared with deficit positions less costly and planned
investment will contract relative to savings.
10
 If banks, the House and the central Bank reduced their spreads and substituted instead20
specific carrying costs (or service charges) on overdrafts and deposits on borrowing and lending and on
negative and positive settlement balances, then it would be clear that the Bank exercises control by
raising or lowering its spread and not raising or lowering an interest rate (such as Bank rate).
The Bank has not reduced reserves (there are none to reduce) by neither open market operations nor
drawdowns, nor has it raised interest rates per se.  Rather it has raised its spread  and the House and its20
banks follow suit.  The whole set of intertemporal transactions services bank provide has increased in
relative price and the volume of bank output contracts.
Since banking output is used by firms and households as inputs into final demand components and as
intermediate inputs in production the decline in banking output is associated with a contraction in final
demand and the net output of the whole economic system.
The Bank attempts to thwart the expansion in banking, and aggregate output, not by contracting the growth
of some particular definition of money or high-powered money nor by raising interest rates.  Rather it does
it by raising the price of liquidity - the charge for the service the Bank ultimately provides.  Since the
demand for liquidity provided by the banks, the House and the Bank is continually changing in a Keynesian
world of uncertainty, the Bank must always be operating with the relative price of banking services and
output.  Central Banks therefore have unrelenting real effects in the economy.  Earlier views which had
Banks changing some costless stock of fiat money can easily be shown, with model-consistent expectations,
to ensure that Banks have no ‘real’ effects. Such views are, however, no longer applicable.  Similarly, those
views which had central Banks setting interest rates and able somehow to affect not just nominal but real
interest rates seem questionable.  No doubt by encouraging banking expansions which could be associated
with higher growth rates, Banks might raise real rates of return, given positive links between growth rates
and real rates of return, but the relationship between central Banking, charges in banking output and real
rates of growth requires more theoretical and empirical study.
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Reconstruction of ISLM and AD/AS Analysis
Consider a simplified set of balance sheets in a banking equilibrium.
Assets Liabilities
Government of Canada
Deposits at Bank of Canada Bonds held by Bank of Canada
Deposits at banks Other Bonds
Bank of Canada
Bonds of the Government of Canada Government of Canada deposits
Negative settlement balances Positive settlement balances
Banks
Positive settlement balances Negative settlement balances
Government Bonds Deposits (including Government of Canada)
Overdrafts
P K  Bank capitalK B
Non-Banks (Households and Firms)
Deposits Overdrafts
P K (Non Bank capital) Net WorthK
It is to be noted that no nominal anchor exists  In nominal terms all magnitudes could be raised or lowered
without any ‘real’ effects.  It is only the liquidity services of the Bank which pin down nominal (and real)
magnitudes in the economy.  There is no H doing this.  This being the case, the level of money wage rates
and prices are indeterminate without Bank activity.
Figure 2
y0
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In terms of AD analysis, one starts with Figure 2.
The position of the AD curve is a function of real variables including the provision of liquidity services by
the Bank.  The lower its service charge the higher will be AD for any given level of prices.  For a given level
of money wages and Bank services charges we have a given AS curve.  The gross output of the economic
system is  where Q is gross output, L and K are non banking labour and
capital and is the output of the banking sector.  However, banking
output, , is a function of labour and capital in banking and the
services supplied by the Bank.  Thus net output is .  In a Keynesian short
run, costs are   where d  is the central Bank spread.  For given W and d , theCB CB
marginal cost or supply price of net output rises in the shortrun because of diminishing marginal products
of labour and banking services as inputs.  For a decrease in d , aggregate demand will increase and alsoCB
the aggregate supply will shift to the right subject to diminishing returns to the provision of liquidity services.
Figure 3
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P
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See Figure 3 for an illustration of this case.
Full employment levels of output, y  , cannot be defined independently of the level of banking output.  Sincef
banking output cannot be defined independently of the flow of liquidity services from the Bank, no precise
definition of full employment level of output is possible.  There is thus no precise natural level of output
because there is no natural level of outputs of banks, Houses and Banks.
Figure 4
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We contrast our AD/AS analysis with those of new classical and new Keynesian economics in Figure 4.
In new classical economics, AS is given at the natural level of output, the AD is drawn to reflect the
existence of ‘real balance’ effects.  A reduction in AD by monetary contraction from AD  to AD  results0 1
only in lower prices with equilibrium at full employment assured by ‘real balance’ effects.  See left panel
of Figure 4.  In new Keynesian economics, with sticky money wages and prices, a reduction in AD by
monetary contraction may result in some initial contraction in real output from y to y  and a reduction inx
prices form P  to P .  ‘Real balance’ effects will overcome the ‘rigidities’, however, and the economy willo x
recover to the full employment level of output and at price level P , replicating, with sluggishness only,1
the new classical case. See right panel of Figure 4.
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 Bank notes as theoretical anchors, though trivial empirically, are replaced by turning the note21
issue over to the private banks. If the Bank used its monopoly note issue as a device to enlist the
public’s support in the monitoring of private banks (e.g., the substitution to Bank notes from bank
deposits), that can be replaced by the willingness of the Bank to accept deposits from any member of
the public. The Bank would, of course, pay no interest on such deposits and they would therefore only
be used by the public in the case of fear about the liquidity of the banking system as a whole. No
nominal anchors are needed for the lender of last resort function by the Bank.
The Keynesian case, for comparison purposes can be read from Figure 5.  
The AD and AS curves, with increases in d , can be read as dealing with a monetary contraction. TheCB
level of output and price levels are lower the higher the service charges, spreads or carrying costs of the
Bank. But given the AD function is perfectly vertical because there are, in an anchorless world, no ‘real
balance’ effects, there are no price level forces re-equilibrating the economy.21
16
Since, in this simple model, one cannot determine the effects of changes of the level of banking output on
the growth rate, no analysis connecting the level of output and ‘the’ rate of interest is possible.  If one
argues that the spread is positively related to (say) the overnight rate, the cash rate or the Bank rate, then
one could interpret d  in Figure 5 as being equivalent to the overnight rate, where, in the IS diagram, d ,CB CB
the Bank’s charge for the provision of liquidity services is replaced by the rate of interest.  
One thing is clear. There is no LM function to contemplate because there is no nominal outside anchor.
In Keynesian economics monetary policy is the anchor and is always real.  It is in this sense that the LM
portion of ISLM has vanished.
Colin Rogers
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Appendix
From 
     
 
such that the denominator being negative and the numerator positive, a lower P is associated with a higher
y.  Rewriting as
 
and taking Z as not a function of P, then
 
and z < O entails the convexity of AD in (P,y).
Since  
with the term in brackets being positive or negative, the relationship between i and P cannot be so simply
ascertained.
